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Article

Foot Voting, Decentralization, and
Development
Ilya Somin †
INTRODUCTION
Most debates over development focus on the question of
how new wealth can be created in a given area—bringing
growth to where people currently are. But, historically, development has often been driven by the ability of people to vote
with their feet for greener pastures—bringing people to where
they can produce more growth. In many cases, the best way to
create new development is to facilitate foot voting by decentralizing political power and breaking down obstacles to mobility.
When people are able vote with their feet in favor of areas
with greater opportunity, development follows. That is true
both when they engage in internal foot voting within a federal
system, and when they do so across international boundaries.
The effects of both types of foot voting are often spectacular. As
Harvard economist and former Secretary of the Treasury Larry
Summers puts it, “I do not think there is a more important development issue than getting questions of migration right.” 1
This Article discusses the implications of foot voting for development and outlines several institutional strategies for expanding foot voting opportunities. It provides a general outline
of some themes that will be explored in greater depth in my
book Free to Move: Foot Voting and Political Freedom. 2
† Professor of Law, George Mason University. Parts of this Article draw
on my forthcoming book, FREE TO MOVE: FOOT VOTING AND POLITICAL FREEDOM. For helpful suggestions, I would like to thank Michael Clemens, Richard
Epstein, Bradley Gardner, Roderick Hills, Alex Nowrasteh, and participants
in the Hong Kong University conference on Decentralization and Development. Copyright © 2018 by Ilya Somin.
1. Lawrence H. Summers, Rethinking Global Development Policy for the
21st Century, Speech at the Ctr. for Glob. Dev. (Nov. 8, 2017).
2. (Oxford Univ. Press forthcoming) [hereinafter SOMIN, FREE TO MOVE].
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Part I summarizes the vast development benefits of foot
voting. Among other things, migration can enable effective exploitation of place premiums—situations where a given individual is likely to be more productive in one location than another.3 The magnitude of place premiums is often enormously
great. Exploiting them effectively can do more to promote development than most, if not all, other policy reforms. This is
true both for international place premiums and domestic ones.
Part II explains how foot voting can provide a powerful
mechanism of political freedom: enabling migrants to choose
those public policies that best fit their needs. In some crucial
respects, foot voting is superior to conventional ballot-box voting. Relative to ballot-box voters, foot voters have stronger incentives to seek out relevant information, and to use it effectively. They also benefit in other ways from the ability to make
a decisive choice about the policies they wish to live under, as
opposed to a system where they only have the power to cast one
vote out of many thousands or millions. In authoritarian societies or poorly established democracies, foot voting may be the
only realistically feasible mechanism of political choice for most
of the population. The superior decision-making enabled by foot
voting increases people’s ability to seek out opportunities and
promote development.
Part III considers the institutional implications of the case
for foot voting. Domestically, we can expand foot-voting opportunities by decentralizing political power and by breaking down
barriers to interjurisdictional mobility. Special measures may
be needed to facilitate foot voting in federal systems where jurisdictional lines track deep ethnic or religious divisions. Internationally, foot-voting opportunities can be enhanced by lowering barriers to immigration and developing institutional
mechanisms to deal with potential negative side effects of freedom of movement.
Foot voting is not a panacea for all development problems,
and it certainly is not a perfect free lunch without downsides.
But we should nonetheless strive to capture its truly enormous
advantages. It is difficult to think of any other development initiative that can bring such vast benefits to so many people.

3. See generally Michael A. Clemens, et al., The Place Premium: Wage
Differences for Identical Workers Across the US Border 1 (Ctr. for Glob. Dev.,
Working Paper No. 148, 2009) (discussing the “place premium” immigrants
from different countries secure by moving to the United States).
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I. PLACE PREMIUMS AND THE DEVELOPMENT
BENEFITS OF FOOT VOTING
One of the most important findings of modern development
economics is that people are often more productive if they move
to a new location—even if their personal characteristics and job
skills do not change. 4 This might occur because one location has
a greater amount of capital to combine with the labor in question. A factory worker, for instance, might move to a region
where his labor is more productive because there are more and
better production facilities for him to utilize. Alternatively, the
migrant may be more productive in a new region because it has
a natural advantage. For example, a farmer is likely to produce
more valuable crops in an area where the soil is richer.
But an even more important reason for place premiums is
that some areas have better economic and political institutions
than others. For example, a Mexican can increase his or her
productivity several-fold simply by crossing over into the United States.5 The main difference between the United States and
Mexico is not greater natural resources or even greater physical
capital, but superior legal, political, and economic institutions. 6
Place premiums also enable increased productivity through
internal migration. The early twentieth-century movement of
African Americans from the South to the North enabled many
to increase their incomes by becoming more productive.7 Some
of the difference was due to greater availability of industrial
capital in the northern states, but some was also due to greater
freedom for blacks in states where their economic opportunities
were less limited by discrimination and legally enforced segregation. 8 Today, growing barriers to interjurisdictional mobility
are a significant obstacle to economic growth in the United

4. See id. at 33–34 (reviewing the evidence).
5. See id. at 41 tbl.8 (reviewing the data).
6. See generally DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS
FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2013) (discussing
the importance of institutions for development).
7. For a discussion of some of the relevant evidence, see, for example,
FLORETTE HENRI, BLACK MIGRATION 133 (1975); Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Federalism, and Political Freedom, in NOMOS: FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 83
(Jacob Levy & James Fleming eds., 2014) [hereinafter Somin, Foot Voting].
8. For citations to relevant literature, see Somin, Foot Voting, supra
note 7.
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States, artificially depressing incomes for the poor and disadvantaged.9
In poor countries, increased development is often driven in
large part by the migration of rural people to cities, where
there are greater job opportunities. In China—the most dramatic recent example of this phenomenon—some 260 million
people migrated from rural to urban areas between 1978 and
2012, usually for economic reasons.10 Much of the migration
flow is towards special economic zones with better institutions. 11 This massive migration has been an important factor in
the country’s rapid economic development, accounting for
somewhere between twenty and thirty-three percent of the stupendous economic growth China experienced from the late
1970s to the present.12
The importance of place premiums is underscored by the
reality that the ultimate purpose of economic development is
not to increase production in a particular location but to increase the well-being of people, regardless of where they might
be located. As economists Michael Clemens and Lant Pritchett
put it, we should seek to maximize “income per natural [person]” rather than per capita income in a particular location. 13
Even if per capita income within the territory of Country X or
Region Y remains the same, development has still increased if
a substantial proportion of the population of X or Y are able to
move to a different location where they can be more productive,
earn higher incomes, and otherwise increase their well-being.14
9. For good overviews of the issues, see David Schleicher, Getting People
Where the Jobs Are, DEMOCRACY (Fall 2016), http://democracyjournal.org/
magazine/42/getting-people-where-the-jobs-are; and David Schleicher, Stuck!
The Law and the Economics of Residential Stability, 127 YALE L.J. 78 (2017)
[hereinafter Schleicher, Stuck!].
10. See BRADLEY M. GARDNER, CHINA’S GREAT MIGRATION: HOW THE
POOR BUILT A PROSPEROUS NATION 5 (2017); cf. Xiaochu Hu, China’s Young
Rural-to-Urban Migrants: In Search of Fortune, Happiness, and Independence,
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/
chinas-young-rural-urban-migrants-search-fortune-happiness-and
-independence (estimating a total of 145 million internal rural-to-urban migrants as of 2009).
11. See Thomas Gries et al., Explaining Inter-provincial Migration in
China, 95 PAPERS REG’L SCI. 709, 713 (2016).
12. GARDNER, supra note 10, at 72.
13. Michael A. Clemens & Lant Pritchett, Income Per Natural: Measuring
Development for People Rather than Places, 34 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 395,
396 (2008).
14. Id.
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Greater development can potentially be stimulated by expanding opportunities for people to vote with their feet and
take better advantage of place premiums. Economists estimate
that the establishment of free migration throughout the world
could as much as double world GDP.15 Even if this estimate
overly optimistic by a large margin, it still implies that eliminating migration restrictions would have an enormous impact
on development.16 It is difficult to think of any other policy
change that can achieve even remotely comparable gains. Even
more modest increases in migration rights could potentially result in greatly increased development.
Obstacles to free internal migration also block valuable development in many countries, both underdeveloped nations and
more advanced ones. In China, for example, many millions of
people are blocked from seeking out valuable job opportunities
by the Hukou system of residency permits, which is only gradually being reformed. 17 In the United States, the poor and lower middle class are often impeded from moving towards job opportunities by restrictive zoning laws, and occupational
licensing regimes that exclude newcomers from numerous professions. 18
The impact of zoning is particularly egregious, insofar as it
prices out poor and lower-middle-class migrants from areas
with strong job markets. 19 A recent study suggests that if the
level of zoning in the United States were reduced to that of the
15. See Michael A. Clemens, Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar
Bills Left on the Sidewalk?, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 83, 83 (2011).
16. For claims that migration restrictions do not much affect productivity
because few additional people would migrate if they were eliminated, see
GEORGE J. BORJAS, IMMIGRATION ECONOMICS 168 (2014). For a critique of the
serious analytical and empirical errors in Borjas’ argument, see Michael A.
Clemens & Lant Pritchett, The New Economic Case for Migration Restrictions:
An Assessment 12–13 (Ctr. for Glob. Dev., Working Paper. No. 423,
2016), https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/CGD-Working-Paper-423
-Clemens-Pritchett-New-Econ-Case-Migration_0.pdf.
17. See Shannon Tiezzi, China’s Plan for “Orderly” Hukou Reform, DIPLOMAT (Feb. 3, 2016), http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/chinas-plan-for-orderly
-hukou-reform; see also GARDNER, supra note 10, at 19–21, 26–27 (describing
the obstacles the hukou system creates for would-be migrants).
18. See Schleicher, Stuck!, supra note 9, at 117; Ilya Somin, Moving Vans
More Powerful Than Ballot Boxes, USA TODAY (Oct. 18, 2016), http://www
.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/10/18/mobility-zoning-licensing-voting
-minorities-column/91990486.
19. See Schleicher, Stuck!, supra note 9, at 129; see also Edward Glaeser,
Reforming Land Use Regulations, BROOKINGS INST. (April 24, 2017), https://
www.brookings.edu/research/reforming-land-use-regulations/amp (providing
an overview of the evidence).
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median American city, the nation could achieve as much as a
9.5% increase in GDP.20 Land-use restrictions also severely
constrain foot-voting opportunities in China, among other places. 21
The harm inflicted by migration restrictions goes far beyond the narrowly economic. Expanded foot-voting opportunities can also massively enhance migrants’ freedom and wellbeing more generally. Consider, for example, women fleeing patriarchal societies, religious minorities fleeing oppression, and
people fleeing repressive tyrannical regimes of various kinds.
In many cases, the potential gains here are as great or greater
than the purely economic benefits of foot voting.
If development is viewed in the broader sense of expanding
human capabilities, 22 then the noneconomic benefits of foot voting are likely just as important as those that relate to increasing productivity, conceived in narrow economic terms. In many
cases, escaping from noneconomic oppression enables migrants
to enormously enhance their capacities in a variety of ways.
The case of women escaping from patriarchal societies where
they have little opportunity to seek an education or other opportunities is a particularly dramatic example. The same goes
for religious and ethnic minorities escaping persecution and
discrimination, political dissenters fleeing oppression, and others whose prospects are artificially constrained by repressive
regimes.
What is true for international migration is also often true
for internal movement. In many countries, some regions offer
greater freedom and equality than others, and migration can
20. See Chang Tai-Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No.
21154, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21154; see also Peter Ganong &
Daniel W. Shoag, Why Has Regional Economic Convergence in the US Declined? 30 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23609, 2017),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w23609 (providing evidence that zoning barriers
to migration have greatly slowed economic growth and cut off poor workers
from job opportunities). For an overview of the evidence, see Glaeser, supra
note 19.
21. For a description of the China case, see Wendell Pritchett & Shitong
Qiao, Exclusionary Megacities, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000724.
22. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 92 (1999) (“[T]he
enhancement of human capabilities also tends to go with an expansion of
productivities and earning power. That connection establishes an important
indirect linkage through which capability improvement helps both directly and
indirectly in enriching human lives and in making human deprivations more
rare and less acute.”).
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help millions of people enjoy the advantages of the former. In
addition to the economic place premium, there is also often
what we may call the freedom premium or justice premium to
expanding mobility.
II. FOOT VOTING AS A SUPERIOR MECHANISM OF
POLITICAL CHOICE
Ballot-box voting is usually seen as the essence of political
freedom and the main mechanism by which most ordinary people exercise political choice. The democratic process has important virtues, but it also has two serious shortcomings: individual voters have almost no chance of actually affecting the
outcome of most elections; and they usually have little or no incentive to make an informed choice. Foot voting is superior on
both counts. That makes it a powerful mechanism for enabling
would-be migrants to seek out opportunities that expand development.
A. IMPACT OF INDIVIDUAL VOTERS
In most contexts, we would not say that a person has
meaningful freedom if they have only a one-in-one-million or
one-in-a-hundred-million chance of making a choice that actually makes a difference. For example, a person has little, if any,
religious freedom if they have only an infinitesimal likelihood
of being able to determine which religion they wish to practice.
The same is true for political choice. As political theorist Russell Hardin put it, “most citizens do not typically have the liberty actually to make any difference to their own welfare through
politics.” 23 Hardin notes that “if my vote is worthless . . .
[h]aving the liberty to cast it is roughly as valuable as having
the liberty to cast a vote on whether the sun will rise tomorrow.” 24
It is not true that the liberty to cast a vote is completely
worthless. At least ex ante, there is a very small chance that it
will swing an electoral outcome. And if that scenario actually
occurs, an individual vote could have great value. 25 This is arguably a sufficient reason to make it instrumentally rational to
23. RUSSELL HARDIN, HOW DO YOU KNOW? THE ECONOMICS OF ORDINARY
KNOWLEDGE 93 (2009).
24. Id.
25. ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER
GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 80 (2d ed. 2016) [hereinafter SOMIN, DEMOCRACY
AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE].
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vote, so long as the cost of voting is low. 26 But a form of freedom
that is not completely worthless may still be highly attenuated,
and greatly inferior, to one where more meaningful choice is
possible.
A small percentage of the population has the ability to influence political outcomes by means other than voting. For example, some can do so through lobbying, campaign contributions, or becoming influential political activists or leaders. 27
However, very few have more than a minimal chance of influencing public policy by these mechanisms. Using them effectively usually requires time, skills, and resources that most ordinary citizens do not have. 28 Moreover, to the extent that a
few people do wield disproportionate political influence by these
means, it only further diminishes the power of the rest of the
population.29
B. LACK OF INCENTIVE TO MAKE AN INFORMED CHOICE
On many normative views of freedom, its effective exercise
requires at least a reasonably informed choice, as well as one
that has a real chance of making a difference. For example,
medical ethicists hold that doctors should generally not perform operations unless they first get the patient’s informed
consent.30 As the American Medical Association Code of Medical Ethics puts it, “The patient’s right of self-decision can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough information to enable an informed choice.” 31 Like medical decisions,
political choices also are often literally matters of life and
death. For millions of people, the outcome of an election might
make the difference between war and peace, wealth and poverty, or sickness and health.
Unfortunately, the low likelihood of decisiveness also creates powerful incentives for voters to make poorly informed
26. For a detailed discussion, see id. at 79–84; see also DEREK PARFIT,
REASONS AND PERSONS 73–75 (1984) (arguing that an extremely small chance
of achieving a particular outcome has rational and moral significance when
that outcome affects a large number of people).
27. SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY 42 (1995).
28. See, e.g., id. at 186 (describing how political influence by means of
mechanisms beyond voting is enjoyed by only a small minority of the population).
29. Id.
30. Opinion 8.08–Informed Consent, 14 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 555,
555 (2012), http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2012/07/pdf/coet1-1207.pdf.
31. Id.
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choices. Precisely because there is so little chance that their
votes will matter, ballot-box voters have strong incentives to be
“rationally ignorant.” 32 The phenomenon of rational ignorance
afflicts voters in the United States and around the world. 33 It
affects virtually all those democracies for which we have relevant survey data. 34 Such ignorance reduces the quality of political decision-making and inhibits development.35
Survey data shows that voters often lack even very basic
knowledge about the candidates and policy questions at issue
in any given election. 36 For example, during the 2014 U.S. midterm election, which focused on control of Congress, polls
showed that only thirty-eight percent of the public knew which
party controlled the House of Representatives before the election, and the same percentage knew which party controlled the
Senate.37 Voters also often have little understanding of how the
government spends its money or which officials are responsible
for which issues. 38
In addition to acquiring very little information, voters have
little incentive to analyze what they do learn in a logical, unbiased way. 39 To the contrary, most have strong incentives to fall
prey to “rational irrationality”: when there are few or no negative consequences to error, it is rational to make almost no effort to control one’s biases. 40
32. Ilya Somin, Rational Ignorance, in ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK OF IGNORANCE STUDIES 274, 277 (Matthias Gross & Linsey
McGoey eds., 2015). The theory of rational voter ignorance was first developed
in ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 238–59 (1957).
33. See Perceptions Are Not Reality: Things the World Gets Wrong, IPSOS
MORI (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/
researcharchive/3466/Perceptions-are-not-reality-Things-the-world-gets
-wrong.aspx (discussing survey data showing widespread public ignorance in
numerous democracies).
34. For a recent comparative analysis of inaccuracies in public perceptions
of political and economic issues in numerous democracies, see id.
35. See generally BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER:
WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD POLICIES (2007) (discussing how voter ignorance and irrationality lead to bad policy); SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL
IGNORANCE, supra note 25 (discussing the extent and dangers of political ignorance).
36. See SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at
17–46 (detailing numerous studies showing voter ignorance).
37. Id. at 17.
38. Id. at 17–18, 117–19.
39. See CAPLAN, supra note 35, at 131–35 (explaining rational irrationality in the context of elections).
40. Id. at 74.
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C. THE SUPERIORITY OF FOOT VOTING
Foot voting is systematically superior to ballot-box voting
on both decisiveness and incentives to acquire information.41 It
enables the individual decision-maker to make a meaningful
choice. When a potential migrant decides where to live, his or
her decision is highly likely to make a real difference to the
outcome. Even those who must secure the agreement of a
spouse or other family member still generally have much greater clout than an average ballot-box voter in an election.
And precisely because their decisions do actually matter,
foot voters have strong incentives to acquire relevant information and use it wisely. A person deciding where to live or
what choices to make in the marketplace and civil society
knows that her decisions have real consequences, and generally
makes more effort to acquire relevant information.
Considerable empirical evidence backs these theoretical
deductions.42 For example, experiments show that people tend
to process political information in a far more biased and less
accurate way than otherwise similar information about nonpolitical issues. 43
Voters can sometimes offset the effects of political ignorance by relying on information shortcuts; small bits of
knowledge that function as proxies for larger bodies of information that they do not know. 44 In my book Democracy and Political Ignorance, I discuss a variety of different shortcut mechanisms in detail, and explain why they are not nearly as

41. Id. at 138–45. For a discussion of moving costs and other factors that
might inhibit effective choices for foot voters, see SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at 165–76; infra Part III.
42. See SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at
136–81 (discussing relevant data and experiments).
43. See, e.g., id.; Dan M. Kahan et al., Motivated Numeracy and Enlightened Self-Government, 1 BEHAV. PUB. POL’Y 54, 54 (2017) (recounting experiments in which subjects used their quantitative-reasoning capacity to selectively conform their interpretation of data to the result more consistent with
their political outlooks).
44. For arguments that shortcuts function well, see, for example, MORRIS
P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS 1–44
(1981) (providing a detailed analysis of retrospective voting, an important type
of information shortcut); ARTHUR LUPIA & MATTHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE
DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW?
(1998) (defending a variety of shortcuts); SAMUEL POPKIN, THE REASONING
VOTER (1991) (arguing that shortcuts are effective).
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effective as advocates claim. 45 In some cases, they even make
the situation worse, such as when voters routinely reward and
punish incumbents for outcomes they did not cause.46 Similar
weaknesses beset claims that the ignorance of individual voters
does not matter because some sort of “miracle of aggregation”
enables the electorate to attain collective wisdom despite it. 47
Here, I will only emphasize that, even if ballot-box voters can
sometimes make reasonably good decisions, foot voters generally do much better. 48
In some cases, the challenge facing both foot voters and
ballot-box voters is not to effectively utilize existing information, but to seek out new information that may not—as
yet—be known to anyone. 49 Here too, foot voters generally have
better incentives than ballot-box voters. 50 For the same reason
that they have strong incentives to seek out and use existing
knowledge, they are also incentivized to find new relevant
knowledge. 51
If foot voters find new information that helps them make a
better decision, the better-informed choice is likely to make an
important difference in their lives. By contrast, a ballot-box
voter who finds new information that might improve her ballot
box decision-making has far less likelihood of gaining anything
for her trouble. Her better-informed vote is still highly unlikely
to make any difference.
As Charles Tiebout showed in his classic article on the subject, foot-voting opportunities can enhance political choice even
if jurisdictions make no special effort to attract migrants. 52 In a
world where all jurisdictions choose policies solely to please
current residents, foot voting can still enhance choice by giving
45. SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at
106–35.
46. Id. at 117–19.
47. Id. at 127–34. For an important recent defense of a version of the
“miracle of aggregation” theory, see HÉLЀNE LANDEMORE, DEMOCRATIC REASON: POLITICS, COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE, AND THE RULE OF THE MANY 156–
60 (2013). For my critique, see Ilya Somin, Why Political Ignorance Undermines the Wisdom of the Many, 26 CRITICAL REV. 151 (2014).
48. For an overview of the evidence, see SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at 148–58 (comparing multiple examples
where foot voting was more effective than ballot box voting).
49. Id. at 164–65.
50. Id.
51. I discuss this issue in greater detail in id.
52. Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416, 418 (1956).
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potential migrants a wider range of options than they would
have otherwise.53 Even if each jurisdiction’s policies are determined without reference to the needs of migrants, the opportunity to vote with your feet can enable many people to find local or regional governments with policies better suited to their
preferences.54
But foot voting becomes an even more powerful mechanism
for enhancing choice if regional governments have incentives to
compete for residents. 55 Competition for tax revenue leads jurisdictions to adopt policies that appeal to potential migrants,
both individuals and businesses.56 That, in turn, can enhance
their opportunities for choice, and promote greater economic
development. 57 Historically, job opportunities and a favorable
economic climate are among the principal determinants of regional migration. 58
Finally, it is important to recognize that foot voting may be
the only possible mechanism of exercising political choice for
the large part of the world’s population that live under authoritarian regimes or weakly established democracies. Freedom
House estimates that some twenty-five percent of the world’s
people live in “not free” undemocratic nations, and another
thirty percent in ones that are only “partly free” (i.e., only partly democratic). 59
III. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR A FOOT VOTING
WORLD
The development benefits of expanded foot voting are potentially enormous. What can countries do to design institutions that capture them, while minimizing potential downsides?
53. Cf. id. at 418 (“ The greater the number of communities and the greater the variance among them, the closer the consumer will come to fully realizing his preference position.”).
54. Id.
55. For a fuller discussion, see Somin, Foot Voting, supra note 7, at 84.
See also SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at
145–46.
56. SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at
145–46.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., supra Part I; cf. SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at 166–67 (outlining the reasons for migrations between
U.S. states).
59. Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis, FREEDOM HOUSE,
https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world
-2018 (last visited Apr. 26, 2018).
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Ideally, institutions should be able to accommodate greatly expanded foot voting across both domestic and international jurisdictional boundaries. In order to maximize development,
countries must especially seek to expand foot-voting opportunities for the poor and oppressed of the world. It is here that the
greatest gains can occur, both narrowly economic and otherwise.
A. FACILITATING DOMESTIC FOOT VOTING
Promoting foot voting has a number of implications for domestic constitutional structures. The most obvious and widely
accepted is the idea that citizens should be able to move freely
between subnational jurisdictions and that the latter should
not be able to stop them from doing so. 60 In the United States
and other advanced democracies, such freedom of movement is
largely taken for granted. As early as 1867, the Supreme Court
struck down a state law imposing an exit tax on people seeking
to migrate to other states. 61
Before the Civil War, however, state-imposed restrictions
on internal migration were far from unusual, with many states
excluding free African Americans, some categories of aliens,
and those considered likely to become public charges. 62 Today,
internal restrictions on migration are far more common in poor
nations. China’s hukou system is a particularly well-known and
important example, because it affects so many people in the
world’s most populous country.63 But regional governments in
other developing nations also seek to restrict migration in various ways. For example, some Indian states seek to keep out
migrants from minority ethnic groups. 64 Some ethnonationalist
60. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Political Ignorance, and Constitutional Design, 28 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 202 (2011) (discussing this necessity)
[hereinafter Somin, Foot Voting, Political Ignorance, and Constitutional Design].
61. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 49 (1867).
62. See MARILYN C. BASELER, ASYLUM FOR MANKIND: AMERICA 1607–
1800, at 190–309 (1998) (discussing state-level migration restrictions in eighteenth and nineteenth century America); Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century
of American Immigration Law, (1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1841–80
(1993) (tracing U.S. immigration law in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).
63. See discussion supra Part I.
64. For a recent overview, see Rameez Abbas & Divya Varma, Internal
Labor Migration in India Raises Integration Challenges for Migrants, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/
internal-labor-migration-india-raises-integration-challenges-migrants.
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political leaders, such as those of the Shiv Sena Party in Maharashtra, India, have even promoted violence against migrants
in order to expel them and deter others from coming. 65
Well-designed constitutional systems can do much to enhance opportunities for foot voting, while minimizing potential
downsides. 66 At a bare minimum, effective foot voting requires
preventing regional governments from either forcibly excluding
migrants or preventing their own people from leaving. It also
requires suppression of antimigrant violence. The latter may be
difficult to achieve in areas where legal institutions are weak or
corrupt and ethnic or religious hostilities between migrants
and natives are severe.
Internal foot voting can be further facilitated by enforcement of relatively tight limits on the scope of central government power, thereby devolving more issues to the regional or
local level. 67 That will ensure that more issues are subject to
foot voting, with lower moving costs. 68 In many situations, moving costs can be further reduced by devolving authority to the
local level, rather than to regional authorities. It is much easier
and cheaper to move from one nearby city or town to another
than to move to a different region.
Not all policy decisions can be devolved to lower-level governments. Some problems are so large-scale that they can only
be addressed by a national government, or perhaps even only
through international cooperation. Global warming is an obvious example of the latter.
But a wide range of issues currently controlled by the U.S.
federal government and other large national governments can
be handled by smaller regional or local governments, as dramatically demonstrated by the success of small nations such as
Switzerland, Luxembourg, Denmark, New Zealand, and oth-

65. Id.; see also SIKATA BANERJEE, WARRIORS IN POLITICS: HINDU NAVIOLENCE, AND THE SHIV SENA IN INDIA 35–52 (2000) (detailing
similar riots involving the Shiv Sena Party in Jogeshwari, Behrampada,
Dharavi, and Govandi/Deonar).
66. This Section builds on ideas first developed in Somin, Foot Voting, Political Ignorance, and Constitutional Design, supra note 60.
67. SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at
167.
68. See Somin, Foot Voting, Political Ignorance, and Constitutional Design, supra note 60, at 221–23; see also SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL
IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at 167.
TIONALISM,
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ers. 69 These countries—which are smaller than many U.S.
states, and even some U.S. cities—have independent policies on
health care, education, social security, and many other issues,
yet perform relatively well and seem not to suffer from an insufficient size and scale.70 More systematic research also finds
that larger democracies generally perform no better than
smaller ones, which suggests that size is not an advantage, at
least not for handling most issues. 71
The optimal distribution of power between different levels
of government cannot be determined by reference to foot voting
alone; a variety of other considerations must also be weighed.
But enhancing opportunities for foot voting is a major consideration in favor of greater decentralization.
Foot voting can also be enhanced by political institutions
that promote competitive rather than cooperative federalism. 72
If regional and local governments are required to raise all or
most of their own funds by taxing their own residents, as in the
competitive federalism model, they will have stronger incentives to adopt policies that offer attractive options to potential
migrants in order to increase revenue. 73 By contrast, cooperative federalism, under which lower-level governments get all or
most of their funding from the central government, undermines
incentives to adopt effective policies that promote development. 74
In some situations, there is a danger that competition will
result in a race to the bottom, in which jurisdictions try to attract businesses in ways that harm ordinary citizens: for example, by allowing firms to take actions that damage the envi-

69. See SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at
227–28 (discussing the ability of small countries to successfully handle policies
on these issues).
70. Id.
71. See generally ROBERT A. DAHL & EDWARD R. TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY (1973) (providing a seminal discussion of the subject).
72. For a discussion of competitive and cooperative federalism, see, for
example, THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG
GOVERNMENTS 1–33 (1990).
73. See, e.g., Somin, Foot Voting, supra note 7; Barry Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1995) (discussing the benefits of
competitive federalism for development).
74. See Weingast, supra note 73.
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ronment. 75 However, race-to-the-bottom concerns are greatly
overstated on both theoretical and empirical grounds. 76
The theoretical flaw in the race to the bottom argument is
that rational revenue-oriented jurisdictions must focus not only
on attracting businesses, but also on attracting workers and
other taxpayers, many of whom care about environmental quality and other similar quality-of-life issues. 77 Those preferences
are also often shared by business interests that seek to employ
such workers, especially high-skilled ones, if only because they
would have to pay higher wages to attract such workers to
places with poor environmental amenities. 78 Wealthier workers
and taxpayers (the sort governments are often especially eager
to attract) are particularly likely to be willing to sacrifice additional income for environmental quality.79 Empirically, subnational governments have often pioneered forms of environmental protection faster than central governments, and do not seem
to systematically favor would-be polluters at the expense of
other potential migrants. 80
This is not to suggest that subnational governments are
immune from capture by business interests that might lobby
75. For a summary and defense of the race to the bottom theory, see
Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There A “Race”
and Is It “ To The Bottom?,” 48 HASTINGS L.J. 274, 274–369 (1997). For other
modern defenses, see, for example, Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Facts
are Stubborn Things: An Empirical Reality Check in the Theoretical Debate
Over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environmental Standard-Setting, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55 (1998); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only from a National Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL’Y F. 225 (1997).
76. For leading theoretical critiques, see Richard Revesz, The Race to the
Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics,
82 MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997) (responding to critics and defending his prior
challenge of race-to-the-bottom arguments) [hereinafter Revesz, The Race to
the Bottom]; Richard Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation,
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (challenging the strength of race-to-the-bottom
arguments).
77. See Revesz, The Race to the Bottom, supra note 76, at 538–40. I discuss these issues in more detail in SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at 168–69.
78. See SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at
168–69.
79. For a summary of the relevant evidence on this point, see Ilya Somin
& Jonathan H. Adler, The Green Costs of Kelo: Economic Development Takings
and Environmental Protection, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 623, 663–65 (2006).
80. See SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at
168–69 (citing relevant studies).
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for excessive pollution or other policies that enable them to
benefit at the expense of the interests of the general public. Far
from it. 81 But there is no inherent reason why such capture is
more of a danger at the local and regional level than with central governments. The possibility of foot voting also puts constraints on such rent-seeking, as jurisdictions especially prone
to it are likely to lose investors and taxpayers over time. 82
Foot voting may have less to offer minority groups in the
many federal systems where they are actually the majority in a
few regions, but widely despised elsewhere. Many federal systems were established for the specific purpose of giving regionally concentrated minorities a jurisdiction of their own, thereby
helping to mitigate ethnic conflict. 83 In such situations, it might
be difficult or even impossible for individuals to move to a region dominated by another ethnic group.
For example, an Iraqi Kurd moving into a majority-Arab
province might reasonably fear violence or, at least, discrimination. Even in the absence of overt hostility, such minority
groups might face painful cultural and linguistic adjustments if
they move out of their home regions. A French Canadian who
moves from Quebec to Alberta is unlikely to face ethnic violence
or even much in the way of discrimination. Even so, moving to
a majority Anglophone province might still be a difficult decision, with substantial transition costs.
Nonetheless, foot voting is still potentially useful under
such conditions. The federal system in question can—and often
should—include multiple majority-minority districts.84 For example, the French-speaking minority in Switzerland can choose
between multiple majority-French cantons. Similarly, Iraq has

81. For some examples of such capture caused, in part, by misinformation,
see generally DAVID SCHULTZ, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE AGE OF IGNORANCE:
WHY LAWMAKERS CHOOSE BELIEF OVER RESEARCH 108–13 (2013) (discussing
examples of states in the United States that have fallen victim to interest
group capture, often resulting from misinformation).
82. For a discussion of how foot voting constrains corruption, see Sunita
Parikh & Barry Weingast, A Comparative Theory of Federalism: India, 83 VA.
L. REV. 1593, 1604–06 (1997) (analyzing India through a comparative federal
performance model to examine the performance of the system and the impact
of corruption in India).
83. See generally DAWN BRANCATI, PEACE BY DESIGN: MANAGING INTRASTATE CONFLICT BY DECENTRALIZATION (2009) (discussing many such examples from around the world).
84. For other potential advantages of such a system, see Donald L. Horowitz, The Many Uses of Federalism, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 953, 958–62 (2007).
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three majority-Kurdish provinces, albeit partially unified under
the Kurdistan Regional Government. 85
Where there is only one majority-minority region, it is
worth considering the possibility of breaking it up to form multiple jurisdictions. French Canadians would likely enjoy a
broader array of foot-voting options if Quebec were divided into
several smaller provinces rather than remain one big one.
I do not suggest that any particular majority-minority jurisdiction must necessarily be divided in order to facilitate foot
voting; other considerations would also have to be weighed before reaching that conclusion in any given case. But the footvoting benefits of partitions should not be neglected.
Such arrangements can allow even regionally concentrated
minorities a degree of choice. That range of choice can be further expanded if more power is devolved to local governments,
rather than just regional ones. Even if it is impossible to form
more than one majority-minority regional government, that region may have many local governments that could potentially
compete with each other.
B. FACILITATING INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
Some of the greatest potential gains from expanding foot
voting are those to be had from freeing up international migration.86 From the standpoint of both economic development and
a variety of noneconomic interests, the difference between living in a poor nation and a more developed one vastly outweighs
the difference between living in the worst region of an advanced nation and the best. But it is also fair to say that international foot voting faces stronger and more widespread and
vociferous opposition than internal foot voting. In both the
United States and many European nations, strong nationalist
movements have arisen that not only oppose expanding immigration but advocate greatly reducing it from existing levels.87
85. For a discussion of Kurdish government, see generally STEPHEN
MANSFIELD, THE MIRACLE OF THE KURDS: A REMARKABLE STORY OF HOPE
REBORN IN NORTHERN IRAQ (2014).
86. See discussion supra Part I.
87. See Ronald F. Inglehart & Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise
of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash (Harvard Uni. Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. RWP16-026, Nov. 2016), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2818659; Conor Friedersdorf, What RightWing Populist Movements Share: Blaming Immigrants, ATLANTIC (June 29,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/what-right-wing
-populist-movements-share-blaming-immigrants/532023.
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This opposition will not be easily overcome. But the vast
gains to be had from expanded migration rights make it imperative to try. Even incremental increases in international footvoting opportunities can save millions of people from what
would otherwise be a lifetime of poverty and oppression. In the
nineteenth century, many millions of poor and oppressed people were able to migrate to relatively freer societies with greater opportunities, such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, thanks in large part to the paucity of migration controls
during that period.88 If border controls are reduced, the lower
transportation costs created by modern technology make such
movement easier today.
Many objections have been offered to the idea of greatly
expanding international migration rights. 89 These include fears
that it will increase crime and terrorism, reduce the wages of
natives, 90 overburden the welfare state, cause the enactment of
harmful policies supported by immigrant voters, and lead to
the spread of dangerous cultural values.91 I cannot review and
assess these objections in detail here. But it is possible to
sketch out a general framework for addressing them.
First, many of the standard objections to free international
migration are significantly overblown. For example, the available evidence indicates that increased immigration does not lead
to increases in per capita welfare spending.92 At least in the
United States, immigrants actually have a much lower crime

88. For an overview, see MASSIMO LIVI-BACCI, A SHORT HISTORY OF MIIpsen trans., Polity Press 2012).
89. I plan to discuss these concerns in far greater detail in SOMIN, FREE
TO MOVE, supra note 2.
90. See, e.g., BORJAS, supra note 16, at 79–148; PHILIP CAFARO, HOW
MANY IS TOO MANY? THE PROGRESSIVE ARGUMENT FOR REDUCING IMMIGRATION INTO THE UNITED STATES 33–54 (2015) (claiming that cheap immigrant
labor lowers wages and benefits for natives, disproportionately impacting the
poor).
91. See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES
TO AMERICA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY 141–294 (2004) (claiming that immigration
threatens American identity and values).
92. See, e.g., ALBERTO ALESINA & EDWARD L. GLAESER, FIGHTING POVERTY IN THE US AND EUROPE: A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE (2004) (indicating that
European nations with greater immigration actually have lower welfare
spending than those with more); Zachary Gochenour & Alexander Nowrasteh,
The Political Externalities of Immigration: Evidence from the United States
(Cato Inst., Working Paper No. 14, Jan. 2014), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato
.org/files/pubs/pdf/working-paper-14-3.pdf (providing evidence from American
states).
GRATION 46–57 (Carl
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rate than native-born citizens do.93 Similarly, the risk that an
American will be killed by an immigrant terrorist is so infinitesimal that it is actually several times lower than the risk that
he or she will be killed by a lightning strike. 94
Where immigration creates genuine problems and negative
side effects, it is often possible to deal with the issue by means
of “keyhole solutions” that minimize the risk without barring
large numbers of immigrants. 95 If, for example, immigration
does impose excessive burdens on the welfare state, receiving
nations could abolish or reduce welfare payments to migrants.96 Excluding immigrants from welfare benefits might be
unjust. But it is surely less so than forcing them to endure the
far greater material deprivation of being condemned to poverty
for the rest of their lives in an underdeveloped nation. Similarly, if there is a credible danger that immigrant voters will cause
the enactment of harmful or unjust government policies, the
obvious solution is to tighten eligibility for the franchise.
In the United States, for example, immigrants cannot become citizens unless they have lived in the country for five
years, demonstrate a knowledge of the English language, and
pass a civics test that many native-born citizens would fail. 97 If
necessary, such standards could be made even more stringent.
Tests could become tougher, naturalization periods can be extended, and so on. Governments can make freedom of move-

93. For a review of the relevant studies and evidence, see MARY C. WATHE INTEGRATION OF

TERS & MARISA GERSTEIN PINEAU, NAT’L ACAD. SCI.,
IMMIGRANTS INTO AMERICAN SOCIETY 326–44 (2015).

94. According to the National Weather Service, an average of twentyseven Americans were killed by lightning over the past decade. Lightning
Deaths at All-Time Record Low in 2017, USA TODAY (Jan. 2, 2018), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/weather/2018/01/02/lightning-deaths-all-time-recordlow-2017/996949001/. By contrast, the annual incidence of death by immigrant
terrorists is far lower. See Alex Nowrasteh, Terrorism and Immigration: A
Risk Analysis, CATO INST. (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.cato.org/publications/
policy-analysis/terrorism-immigration-risk-analysis.
95. For examples of such proposals see Bryan Caplan, Why Should We Restrict Immigration?, 32 CATO J. 5 (2012). I will further outline such ideas in
SOMIN, FREE TO MOVE, supra note 2.
96. Cf. MARTIN RUHS, THE PRICE OF RIGHTS: REGULATING INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIGRATION (2013) (arguing that limiting the welfare rights of labor
migrants can enable increased migration).
97. SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 25, at
212.
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ment easier while making it tougher for new immigrants to become citizens or acquire certain other types of rights. 98
Long-term exclusion from the franchise may be unfair or
unjust to immigrants. But it is a lesser injustice than excluding
them from the country entirely, which would condemn most to
a lifetime of poverty and oppression. In most of their home nations, the would-be migrants also have little or no influence
over public policy. This is particularly true in the many nations
that have authoritarian governments or are only partly democratic.
Where other keyhole solutions might be inadequate, policymakers should also consider tapping the vast wealth created
by immigration to mitigate negative side effects that cannot be
addressed in other ways. If, for example, immigration drives
down the wages of native low-skilled workers and this is considered a morally unacceptable outcome, national governments
can impose a surtax on the incomes of recent immigrants and
redistribute the wealth to those native workers whose wages
have been depressed. 99
Like exclusion from welfare benefits and the franchise,
such discriminatory taxation may be unjust. But it, like other
keyhole solutions, still leaves the immigrants far better off than
they would be if left out of the country entirely. Paying, say, a
ten-percent-higher tax rate in a country where the immigrant
earns three times as much as she would in her homeland still
leaves her vastly better off than she would be otherwise.
Along the same lines, if immigration does lead to an increase in crime, tax revenue generated by the wealth it creates
can be used to fund additional police forces and other law enforcement tools that can bring crime down again. 100 Lowering
migration barriers can potentially double world GDP. 101 Some
of that new wealth could be used to alleviate possible negative
side-effects of migration, while still leaving enabling vast gains
for both immigrants and natives.
In sum, understandable objections to expanded migration
should be addressed by a combination of assessing whether the
objection is overblown, implementing keyhole solutions, and—
98. See generally RUHS, supra note 96 (discussing a variety of such policy
options).
99. See Caplan, supra note 95, at 9.
100. I will develop this proposal in greater detail in SOMIN, FREE TO MOVE,
supra note 2.
101. See Clemens, supra note 15, at 84–89.
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where necessary—tapping the wealth created by immigration
to mitigate negative side effects and compensate adversely affected natives.These strategies may not always be feasible.
There may perhaps still be extreme situations where migration
restrictions are the only possible way to prevent some great
harm.102 But they can at least enable vastly freer migration
than is currently feasible.
Perhaps this assessment is too optimistic and keyhole policies can only enable a modest increase in migration. But even
such a modest increase can still greatly enhance development
and liberate millions of people from tyranny and privation.
CONCLUSION
For many of the poorest and most oppressed people in the
world, the most likely path to economic development and political freedom runs through foot voting. Expanded foot voting can
also do much for the relatively disadvantaged residents of more
advanced nations. It is, furthermore, often a better mechanism
for decision-making than conventional ballot-box voting.
It will not be easy to overcome the many barriers to expanding foot-voting opportunities, especially with respect to international migration. Progress towards that objective is likely
to be incremental. But even limited gains can make an enormous difference.

102. I will consider a number of such possible scenarios in SOMIN, FREE TO
MOVE, supra note 2.

